BElWEEN 'mE SPECIES

70

ism. All this is written in a style particu
larly plain, simple, and pe.rsonal, and pro
vides, I think, the chief warrant for Frey's
presenting this book as a "critical introduc
tion
completely accessible to non
philosophers,
students, and the educated
public" (p. ix). Despite the clarity of the
prose, some of these constituencies will
likely find some later sections tough going;
at the srune time, bearing in mind the scope
of the intended audience may explain features
of the text which will strike philosophers as
odd. I have in mind here his rel::€ated app<eal
1:0 the "controversial" nature of some of the
claims made by some proponents of aniJnal
rights as a basis for rejecting those claims.
It seew.s a bit odd for a philosofl!'1er--even if
working in an "applied area"--to be shy of
controversy; lnaybe Frey's idea is that dis
cussions that ultimately need to engage the
public cannot proceed along lines that are
overly contestible. But !uore of this later.

which bear upon the casuistry of our rela
tions with animals--e.g., "the relative value
of animal and human life, the relative value
and weight of anirrL"l.l and human suffering, the
alleged impossibility of valuing animal su.f
fering without valuing animal life" (p. 168).
In his final footnote, he pror:lises to deal
with these issues in a forthcomi.ng book,
which is to be a critical assessment of mo
dern mJral vegetarianism.
Rig~ts,. ~.lLLng
and ~~~ge.r:iQ.~ is that book.
The focus of the first !x.JOk was to de
monstrate that ai1irnals--indeed, all creatures
that lack language--fail to have interests
which are deserving of moral consideration.
Interests and Rights, in my view, had naJ"ly
virtues:
it was written in a clear and en
gaging style and drew attention to important
f&"ltures of a crucial element of animal Ii 
beration and animal rights-type argwnents, as
well as of much of contemporary moral theory
in general, vi~., the concept of interests.
However, the general critical reaction to the
!xXJk supports my judgment that it was not
successful in establishing its main thesis
(in fact, Frey himself retreats from at least
one important position of the first brXlk, as
I discuss below) • [l] The current book is
fundamentally an attack on arguments for
vegetarianism that hinge on the ability of
animals to feel pain--or, as Frey prefers to
put it, "unpleasant sensations" (p. 175)-
although arguments based on moral rights and
on the alleged wrongfulness of killing are
closely exrunined and found wanting as well.
The conclusion is that neither considerations
of eights nor of killing nor even of suffer
ing provide one with good grounds to become a
vegetarian.
The book shares in lnany of the
virtues of the earlier one:
it is clear,

Frey surveys a nwnber of possible ra
tionales for vegetarianism and concludes that
the fllDst promising, considered from the point
of view of convincing people to lay aside
their oITU1ivorous habits are moral. Arguments
based on aesthetics, religion, waste, or
"personal style" are just too idiosyncratic;
the argument that vegetarianism is healthier
than other diets is difficult to assess and
not likely to overcome a widespread indiffer
ence to the relationship between entrenched
personal habits pnd our health.
In any
event, such points can be met my moderation
in consumption and by applying pressure on
the meat industry to reduce toxic levels in
their products.
Frey's first part also lets us know that
moral vegetarianism interests him only to the
extent that it is based on concern for the
welfare of animals.
One may wonder why.
Surely, the argument that he focuses most of
his attention on, the argwnent from suffer
ing, must be as salient concerning Ethiopians
as it is respecting veal calves.
His answer
is that it is concern for animal, rather than
for human, welfare which has reanimated moral
vegetarianism; it is in the light of the rise
of intensive fanning ifrlat the whole question
of what we eat has asswned a new sense of
moral urgency.
Thus, limiting his focus is
certainly reasonable in principle; there are
hard issues in plenty just focusing on animal
welfare.
But it should be kept in mind that
the form of argwnent for moral vegetarianism
which he ultimately rejects is not
the

lively, and wide-ranging.
It also raises a
nwnber of points that people concerned about
morality in general, as well as about the
moral status of animals, would do well to
consider. Does it do any better with respect
to its central claim?
Finally, I think not.
But along the way there is a good deal to
repay a reader's attention.
Rig~ts, Killing an~ SufferiQ.9.: is written
in five parts, each generally consisting of a
series of short chapters.
Part I is intro
ductory matter; it descends from broad re
flections on the relation of reason and ac
tion, through strata in which moral reasons
for acting as a vegetarian are distinguished
from non-moral reasons for so acting, to a
discussion of the types of moral vegetarian
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strongest possible form of the argument. For
in assessing the suffering argument
he balances off the savings in animal suffer
ing against the costs in human suffering
which, given his premises, is fair enough, as
far as it goes.
But he completely fails to
consider the savings in human suffering which
could follow from a shift to a less wasteful,
vegetarian diet.

fore considering this part of Frey's posi
tion, his criticisms of tile arguments from
rights and from the wrongfulness of killing
deserve some attention.

ex~nple,

RIGHTS
Part III is a sustained critique of
moral rights. Rights, for Frey, are distrac
tions empty of tlleoretically defensible con
tent.
Rights appeals lnay have some rhetori
cal force, but they contribute nothing to
reasoned
resolution of
!!'Oral
problems.
Rights impart no gain in clarity, preC1Slon,
or insight to our handling of !!'Oral issues.
What's more, if there were anything to be
gained by talk of rights, an act-utilitarian
basis could be given for lliem which would be
much superior to the current non-consequen
tial approaches characteristically used to
undergird rights.

While marrying both the animal and the
human welfare strains of the argument might
bolster the case for moral vegetarianism, it
wouldn't fundamentally change the character
of the position which Frey attacks.
He in
veighs against a "conditional" or "negative"
vegetarianisrn--i.e., a position which enjoins
meat-eating not because of the intrinsic
wrongfulness of consuming flesh but because
of vegetarianism's effectiveness as a tactic
against factory farming.
Factory farming is wrong, it is alleged,
because (a) such methods of rearing and
slaughter violate animals' rights or (b) such
methods involve the killing of animals, which
is wrong, or (c) animals so reared suffer
greatly and hence are wrongly treated.
Frey
consistently tries to drive a wedge between
the alleged wrongs to animals involved in
failing to respect tileir rights, killing
them, or causing them pain, on the one hand,
and consuming them on the other.
This is an

Frey explores three reasons why appeals
to moral rights are vacuous.
The first rea
son plays on the obscurities of the relation
ship between the concept of a rroral right and
the distinction between right and wrong.
There surely are ways of wronging someone
that don't, on anyone's account, involve
violating any of their rights, Frey suggests.

D~portant feature of his overall case,
since
the second feature of his attack--discredit
ing the grounds upon which intensive farming
is supposed to be wrong succeeds (on his own
account) only against the arguments from
rights and killing.
Frey admits that it is
wrong to cause animals to suffer.
But that
wrongfulness does not mystically transfer to
eating animals--or even to purchasing dead
animals for food from those who have caused
them to suffer in the course of preparing
them for market.
Refraining from eating
animals is only !!'Orally rnandated if that is
the most effective way of reducing the all'Ount
of anirnal suffering.
As Frey sees it, it is
not.

He may well be right about that, and it
is an issue that deserves clear scrutiny.
writers from Aristotle to John Ladd have
argued that moral notions like justice and
the oft-associated idea of rights are rele
vant only in certain contexts. [2] But just
what contexts those are may be more proble:lla
tic than Frey realizes, to judge from his own
example.
Husband Heathcliff adamantly refu
ses to serve wife Cathy fried eggs, despite
her ardent desire for them, and further,
despite the fact that making eggs in that
fashion wouldn't discommode Heathcliff one
bit. Now, Frey would have his readers agree,
although Heathcliff may well be doing wrong
to Cathy, it would surely be silly to under
stand that as a matter of violating Cathy's
right to fried eggs for breakfast.

Clearly, then, one issl;le that Frey's
book invites us to consider is the relation
ship between engaging directly in an imll'Oral
practice and benefitting from and supporting
that practice.
This, indeed, is a crucial
issue in tenus of his attack on moral vege
tarianism, since he will allow that factory
farming is morally objectionable insofar as
it causes avoidable net suffering.
But be
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I don 't know that the matter is quite as
plain as Frey puts it. One might wonder just
why Heathcliff is so indifferent to the de
sires of his wife and suspect that the objec
tionable character of Heathcliff's action
comes less from the frustration Cathy may
actually feel and !!'Ore from a certain atti72

it seenB likely that there would be sane
difficult priority disputes.
But tile criti
cal line that Frey takes here is simply to
point out that the kinds of rights claims
tilat people actually dispute ~ut '--e.g.,
disagreem~t about U1e right to keep and bear
arms--seem Ve:J:.y remote from the allegedly
fundamental right.

tude
that Heathcliff's action
expresses
toward her.
It may tu:m out, after all, to
be hard D) capture this intuitive sense of
what's wrong here with accounts that reduce
everything to consequences, especially if
those are understood as consequences of which
CatllY has sanehow to be avlare.
For, if
Heathcliff's recalcitrance here is a way of
expressing his cont~npt for his partner, tilen
it se~s plausible to say that he has failed
to dccord to Cathy the respect dUf~ her--and
thereby violated a right she has, not to
fried eggs, but to her spouse's respect i~~d

However, this does not seem a decisive
criticism.
Dworkin, I take it, is carunitted
to such rights following (if, in fact, they
do) from the right to equal concern and re
spect; Frey is dubious.
The way to resolve
this is for Dworkin, or someone of like mind,
to take his best shot at working out a deri
vation and then for Frey and his allies to
dig out flaws in it.

concenl.

Frey could surely respond that all tllis
is slinply lY2gging the question; it doesn't do
the first thing toward showing that any of
C:l.t.':ty's "rights" have been violated. But the
case was presented for intuitive judgment,
and it could well produce intuitions which
would ill fit act-utilitarianism.
Some sort
of non-consequentialist approach mi<Jht turn
out to supply a well-behaved conception of
rights which would shed some light on those
intuitions ~ut Cathy's disappointing break
fasts.

If, taking anotiler tack, one postulates
several basic flDral rights, as do tlrinkers
like H. J. McCloskey and J. L. Mackie, one is
left with the problem of resolving conflicts

Frey's second line of attack is that
rights are superfluous at best.
They are
justified, i f at all, by the valid =ral
principles which stand behind them, and if
you allow the principles, the rights have no
work to do.
Sane non-consequentialist wri
ters slip back and forth between rights-talk
and principle-talk without seeing much of an
issue. [3] For them, as for ot~ers, the real
issue here may not be whether there are
"rights" or "principles" but whether the
best-defensible moral theory is consequen
tialist or not. Frey does not directly argue
that tile priority problem is a serious one;
rather, he goes on to claim that the most
fundamental problem is the arbitrariness of
non-consequentialist accounts of moral norms.
Such views leave us to fall back on our own
viscera in order to discover fundamental
moral principles (or rights) and to adjudi
cate the conflicts which arise between them.
Recent efforts in the literature include
systems
which have but one
fundamental
right--e.g., the right to equal concern or
respect, as prominently feature in Ronald
Dworkin's :raking Rights Seriously. All other
rights are derived, and rights conflicts
settled with reference to the fundamental
right.
But even with common ground of this
sort, without an additional battery of auxil
iary (and possibly contentious) principles,

at a basic level. Such conflicts, as McClos
key admits, may not be resolvable rationally.
If part of the point of secular et.'1ics
is to provide the conditions for public dis
cussion of moral matters, tllen the intuition
ism which seems to infect rights-based theo
ries to one extent or another is a serious
problem.
Sane wo.rkers in this tradition-
like Tom Regan, whose discussion of the theo
retical foundation for rights in his The case
fo~ Anlinal Rights is not mentioned by
Frey-
develop mechanisms designed to produce "qual
ified" moral intuitions; the intuitions qual
ify if they pass a number of tests--which
themselves seem largely intuitive.
But it
seems not unreasonable to believe that such
"qualifying intuitions" may be rather broadly
shared.
And, in any event, the general tac
tic of checking theoretical judgments against
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We can note, for instance, that rights are
not all of a piece, neither in point of their
moral importance nor in their resistance to
utility.
We can note further that we think
it sometimes wrong to exercise a right.
Ob
servations of this kind may support an act
utilitarian theory "amenable to individual
rights" using a concept of individual rights
"amenable to (act- )utilitarian theory."

intuitions seems hard to avoid altogether;
even given the difficulties of appeal to
intuition, it seems that a moral theory which
is totally divorced from cO!lllOCln lTDral beliefs
would be of no more use in providing the
grounds for shared rational discourse on
these matters than those which merely eleva
ted the idiosyncracies of a particular social
class to the status of absolute moral princi
pies.

This approach seems to miss the point.
Surely, the fundamental feature about anti
act-utilitarian intuitions is that they are
expressions of the notion that there is some
thing about moral situations that utility
does not capture. Successful secret killings
of persons are wrong, we think, and not be
cause v,e can rig things so as to make ·the
consequences bad.
In fact, it isn't clear,
on the act-utilitarian view, why we ought to
try to make sanething bad, i f it isn't bad
already.
Why not reject the intuition, ra
ther than cater to it?
If people think that
something is wrong when it isn't or think it
is worse than it actually is, should we
strive to reeducate them or strive to change
the moral reality of the situation?
Frey
would presumably answer this question in
tenns of the consequences following on either
course of action.
It follows from such a
view that the proper response to take to

Many rights theories--~Eckie's and Re
gan's among them--dismiss consequentialism
because of their impression that such views
outrage basic moral intuitions, and then seek
out accounts which can capture these intui
tions.
Such accounts seem crucially to in
volve such non-consequentialist elements as
"principles" and "rights." The acceptability
of such views rests on the probity of appeals
to intuitions, on the assessment of the pre
valence of anti-consequentialist intuitions,
and on the correctness of the judgment that
consequentialism hasn't the resources
to
account for such ostensibly contrary intui
tions ~ as there are.
Frey attacks all these

claims.
The strategy here is encanpassing, to
say the least.
Frey appears to be arguing
that appeals to intuition are irrelevant and
that there are as many significant pro-conse
quentialist intuitions as anti-consequential
ist intuitions.
At the same time, he tries
to portray act-utilitarianism as a moral view
which has the resources to deal with osten
sibly anti-consequentialist intuitions.
I
think his attempt here is unsuccessful.

actions or practices judged wrong on the
basis of anti-act-utilitarian intuitions will
itself be a matter of utility, and this re
sult, I should think, will outrage anti-act
utilitarian intuitions as much as anything.
If the morality of secret and painless kill
ings, say, in any fundamental part is a mat
ter of whether there are effective techniques
for brainwashing those of us who feel that it
is wrong, then no non-utilitariaI) is likely
to feel that a proper account of the matter
has been reached.

Rights can be seen as barriers against
decisions made solely on consequentialist
grounds, in deference to the supposedly coun
ter-intuitive character of these decisions.
But how high a barrier is required?
The
problem of determining the strength of rights
is seen by Frey as affording an opening to
the act-utilitarian.
A carefully chosen
scheme of rights may have both a high accept
ance utility and a (generally) high observ
ance utility; such a scheme will resist vio
lation on the basis of merely marginal incre
ments in utility.
Various measures can be
taken to increase the utility of observing
the scheme--e.g., legal and informal sanc
tions for departing fran its provlslons.
Additionally, we can review our concept of a
right--or, as Frey puts it, "loosen certain
preconceptions about rights"--which will make
the act-utilitarian account more palatable.
BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES

As Frey goes on to admit (in Chapter
10), the system of act-utilitarian rights he
offers gives us only "shadow" rights.
They
do not "trump" utility; rather, they are
created on a foundation where the utilities
of accepting them and observing them as
guides to action resistant to mere marginal
increments of utility are carefully factored
in and buttressed round with extrinsic "Util
ity-intensifiers." But as we have seen, the
"extrinsic utility-intensifier" move sets up
serious conflicts with just the sort of moral
intuitions that the strategy was originally
designed to accommodate.
While in the ab
sence of such intensifiers, the position
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seems more shadowy than ever.

dubious, I think., because there is no good
reason to suppose that resolving lTIOral dis
putes in terms of explicit calculations of
utility will actually rnaximize the overall
uhlity.
It may well be the case that the
utilitarian good is best Pursued indirectly-
i.e., by encX)uraging !!.oi J.2<?} loi to act ac
oording to non-oonsequentialist principles,
while the c~scenti act according to act
utilitarianism.
The very possibility that
SUd1 "indirect oonsequentialism" may be the
llIOSt efficient way of pursuing the good
raises disturbing spectres:
it may well be
tl1e case that Ilorality would mandate blffining
what is actually rrorally good, praising what
is morally wrong, or lying about llOral prin
ciples.
If this possibility oould becone
actual, tl1en the virtue of act-utilitarianism
--that it undergirds effective and embracing
llIOral discourse-'-would lapse.

Frey spends some time exploring R. M.
Hare's "two-level" acoount of moral thinking,
which distinguishes a "critical" and an "in
tuitive" level in our reflections, locates
rights at the intuitive level, and assigns
the critical job of determining guides for
living to act-utilitarianism.
All this in
aid of "drawing the sUng from the charge
that act-utilitarianism conflicts witl1 ordi
nary rrorality" (p. 90). But Frey is dubious:
Hare's
account demands that agents make
"global determinations," since more overall
utility will be produced by accepting a par
ticuldr guide, not as a rule of tl1umb, or
"shadow right," but as a "full blooded"
right, even in situations where, at least
locally, utility would be better servE.'Ci by
our making exceptions.
Are we better in a
position to make global or local determina
tions of utility? Hare apparently thinks tl1e
former; Frey inclines to the latter.

KILLING

If Frey is right, it seens that he has
dealt his own position something of a blow.
After all, his own attempt to locate rights

Many defenders of animals may not be at
all distressed by Frey's sustained argument
against rights; with some notable exceptions
(e.g., Joel Feinberg and Tom Regan) many of
the rrost influential rights theorists find
that animals have no place in their systems.
'utilitarian L~eories characteristically de
mand much less for moral oonsiderability;
mere sentience will do.
For this reason,
Frey regards the utilitarian argwnent that
oontemporary farming practices cause much
llIOre pain and suffering than they do pleasure
to be the vegetarian's llIOSt plausible line.

within act-utilitarianism is defective, and
not only on the basis of the argument of this
review; he himself admits that it yields only
shadow rights.
Hare's attempt is also unsa
tisfactory. . So, despite his claim to b'1e
oontrary, Frey provides us with· no reason to
think that a rights approach is compatible
with act-utilitarianism.
Does this matter?
After all, we ha.'Je been assured that rights
oontribute noti1ing to our deliberations about
morality.

But before eXffinining "the pain and suf
fering argument," Frey oonsiders the attempt
to found llIOral vegetarianism upon an appeal
to the wrongness of killing. He is skeI;'tical
about any such attempt on what seems pritnari
ly rhetorical grounds: it is simply going to
be hard to oonvince people that they ought to
become vegetarians on such a basis, given how
re(~ndite
the issues are.
Frey regards the
issue of the morality of killing to be one on
which we are deeply split along utilitarian/
non-utilitarian lines;
the oonsiderations
that either side adduces to explain just why
killing is wrong strike the other as hardly
to be credited, especially when someone on
either side tries to advance an argument for
extending the prohibition against killing to
cover anitnals.

As I understand it, much of utilitarian
ism's appeal comes from its promise to afford
a oontext for shared discourse about norali
ty.
The appeal to non-oonsequentialist con
siderations--whether they be rights or prin
ciples--is vitiated by the fact that they
rely on inbJitions to adjudicate disputes,
and it is precisely such intuitions tl1at are
likely to be in dispute.
But if oonsequen
tialistic results outrage widely shared in
tuitions, it seems unlikely that the added
efficiency of that approach will compensate
for its revisionist nature.
And, what is
more, it is not clear that utilitarianism
will actually be a better basis for public
moral discourse, in part because of disputes
about what oonsequences mi']ht actually ensue
fran what decisions, about how those oonse
quences would affect utility, and so forth.
Its place in public disoourse is all the rrore

It is, I suppose, quite appropriate for
applied philosophy to be particularly oon
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research (as shown by the appeal to benefit)
and since there are no morally relevant dif
ferences between such animals and sorne humans
(e.g., profoundly mentally retarded infants)
such humans are also permissible subjects of
such research.
Utilitarians would generally
appeal to "side effects" to ward off such a
result, but Frey isn't impressed-the revul
sion that Harry would feel at this rncdest
proposal is a matter, after all, of psycholo
gical contingencies of which education of the
proper sort might well rid us.
(Recall
my
objections to Frey's own use of contrived
side
effects to bolster "act-utilitarian
rights.") Perhaps Frey would put more weight
on side effects if he tried to defend another

cerned about the persuasive force of a given
line of arg1.11'nent, as well as about the argu
ment 's soundness.
I don't, however, think
that the situation is just as he paints it;
in my view, the account of the wrongness of
killing put forward by act-utilitarianism
constitutes one of its major theoretical
embarrassments.
Perhaps it is from a sense of the vul
nerability
of act-utilitarianism in this
respect that Frey is concerned to derronstrate
the weakness of other positions as well. One
would think that if Frey chose at this point
to discuss the work of others, he would se
lect someone like Regan, or Steve F. Sapont
zis, whose views about the wrongness of kill
ing animals are well-known fu,d carefully
argued.
Instead, he chooses to discuss a
writer of less philosophical sophistication,
Michael W. Fox, whose position, as Frey
shows, suffers from a number of confusions.
Fox is taken as attempting a defense of the
"reverence for [all] life" position, which
isn't hard to make look dubious.
others of Frey's arguments in this con
nection are directed more carefully, and at
more substantial targets.
Using a distinc
tion introduced by James Rachels, between
"being alive" and "having a life," Frey ar
gues persuasively that the Ilajor fcod animal,
the chicken, cannot reasonably be said to
have much of a life; this point is particu
larly deft in that it brings to mind Torn
Regan's "subject of a life" notion and the
associated criterion introduced in his The
Case for Animal Rights of "one year old mam
mals" as rroral paradigms.
Mother target
that brings Regan to mind is the "marginal
cases argument"--i.e., the claim, often ap
pealed to by Regan in his earlier work, that
since many animals are on a par with many
(damaged) humans in all rrorally relevant
respects, whatever noral status the latter
enjoy must be accorded as well to the fonner.
In past work, including Interests and Rights,
Frey was inclined to think that morally rele
vant differences could be found in such areas
as potentiality, the possibility of ensoul
ment, and in physical resemblance.
He now
(wisely, it seems to me) regaIds all of these
points as inadequate bases for any morally
important difference.
But although he now
accepts the marginal cases argument,
he
stands it on its head:
it is the moral
status attributed to damaged humans that
needs to be revised downwards. Since animals
are acceptable for use in serious scientific
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES

that rrar
implication of his account here:
ginal humans could be produced for the table
as well as for the laboratory.
In another place I have discussed Frey's
"inverted espousal" of the marginal cases
argument and have argued that his failure to
examine the erootions surrounding the birth of
a "marginal human"--in particular, the sense
of tragedy such an event evokes in us--allows
him to miss morally relevant, counter-factual
differences between such humans and animals.
Frey is himself much affected by these feel
ings--his conclusion here is one he is uncorn
fortable with--but he is willing in the end
to disown them and mark for elimination via
re-education.
As I see it, his erootions are
responding to a richer set of features than
those he consciously considers and finds
wanting as noral disanalogies. [4]
All this also serves once again to high
light the discrepancies between act-utilitar
ianism and cOlllUOn morality.
It is perhaps
worth bearing in mind in considering Frey's
defense of intensive meat production that it
is mere contingencies--in principle elirnin
able--which make it wrong for factory farms
to be turning out h = meat.
Frey's
substantial

76

"killing" section also contains
chapters on the doctrine of dou

Frey responds that there is more to the ga~
eration of utility than mere numbers, that
these people need to maintain a certain qual
ity of life for their existence to be of real
overall benefit, and that there's no reason
why
t~e
availability of meat
resources
shouldn't be one of the criteria determining
em optimal population policy.

ble effect and on problems in the development
of a genuine or "deep" ecological ethic.
Both of these chapters are significant in the
light of the currently vigorous discussions
of these topics in the literature, but their
relationship to the central theme of the
book--the examination and rebuttal of tlrree
types of argument for moral vegetarianism--is
a bit eccentric.

This argument is very weak; one can only
suppose that it has been influenced by the
lamentable way vegetables are prepared in
Frey's British hane.
There is no reason why
the availability of meat resources should be
among t~e criteria for optimal PJPulatioo--no
reasons affecting either health or the quali
ty and variety of available gustatory sensa-·
tions.
If, all other things being equal, a
hunan population of, say, 2x could produce
two time:3 the amo\mt of utility as could a

SUFFERING
In a transition trom his consideration
of killing to that of suffering, Frey exa
mines Peter Singer's views on the "replace
ability argument." This argument is anotl1er
of the curious features of act-i1tilit~'irian
ism's account of the wrongness of killing.
It points out that since the wrongness of
killing many animals cannot be explained in
terms of their own preferences to remain
alive, nor in terms of side effects, L~en it
must reside solely in the diminution of the

population of x, minus on!:i whatever utility
loss accrues solely fran the eating of fruits
and vegetables rather than meat, it seems
incredible that this one loss could overbal
ance all the other positive features supplied
by the larger population.
Perhaps the PJint
that Frey ought to make here is that the
argument attempts to rescue moral vegetarian
ism in a way that does not directly regard
anirral interest.
For, if such arguments are
to be allowed, the population point as dis
cussed here is academic; the fact is that
there are presently irrmense munbers of people
whose lives might well be enhanced--even
saved--if we were to alter our wasteful me
thods of protein production.

sum total of happiness in the world.
But in
the case of hillldreds of millions of food
animals, the utility lost by their death is
made up for by their replacements--the next
huge generation of food animals who will lead
lives of roughly equal utility. So, in point
of the loss of utility, killing animals for
food is not objectionable.
It is also im
port.-:mt to PJint out that we are not in a
position to substantially increase utility
simply by ceasing to kill food animals, while
cont.inuing to allow new generations of equal
size to enter the world, nor is it likely
that we could even maintain current levels of
animal-generated utility if we stopped using
those animals for food. Were we to do so, it
seems lmlikely that we could maintain any
thing like current levels of animal popula
tion.

Frey's response to the second point-
that ralslng and replacing miserable, inten
sively farmed animals represents a net drain
on utility--is more interesting, particularly
in that it sOilllds what will be a major theme
in his response to moral vegetarianism' s ~st
eDrnpelling eDnsideration, the argument from
suffer.ing. He names this theme the "amelior
ation" argument; in the present context, it
eDnsists in ~~e claim that meat-eaters could
respond to Singer's challenge not by becaning
vegetarians but by working to improve eDnm
tions on factory farms such that the anil11rJ.ls
living there might enjoy a positive utility
balance and, hence, would be replaceable
without diminishing overall utility.
One
important consideration here is how much
these conditions would have to be improved;
Frey suggests that the required improvements
may be fairly manageable; not all farm ani
mals, it must be admitted, are treated as
badly as veal calves or as battery caged

So, the Singer-type vegetarian--him!her
self an act-utilitarian--needs to maintain
either that vegetarianism will provide com
pensatory utilities elsewhere or that L~e
lives of intensively farmed animals are an
actual utility drain, so that the replacement
strategy actually only replaces net misery
with net misery.
Singer has made both moves, and Frey
colmters both.
The "greater compensation"
strategy takes the particular form of noting
that with non-rneat diets, the earth could
sustain a larger PJPulation of persons, pre
sumably richer potential utility generators.
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has been or will be at all effective in this
regard.
Further, the reform position advo
cated by the concerned individual can pro
gressively reduce animal suffering without
exacting the cost that vegetarianism entails.

hens. Another question concerns the level of
improvement that would be acceptable; the
replac~ility argument would seem to support
the view that morality is satisfied so long
as animals don't suffer an altogether miser
able existence.
Singer sometimes writes as
though he espouses what is here called a
"single (p:tinful) experience view," and in
other places as t.l-tough he accepts the miser
able life perspective; other cut-off points
are, of course, at least imaginable. A third
question will be one of tactics:
how may we
best obtain whatever level of amelioration we
determine to be necessary?

What cost?
As Frey portrays it, com
plete conversion to vegetarianism would have
a massive negative imp:tct on the economies of
entire nations.
The collapse of the meat
industry would have terrible repercussions
throughout the entire food industry.
Great
numbers of people would be thrown out of
work, and tax revenues would be seriously
reduced at just the time when subsidies and
social programs to offset lost earnings would
be p:trticularly required.
0ti1er sources of
livelihood--the
clothing,
phanoaceutical,
veterinary, p..lblishing, and advertising in
dustries--would be depressed as well.

Frey takes a more sanguine view than
Singer concerning the inmensity of farm ani
mal suffering and more consistently espouses
the miserable existence view.
But the major
difference is that Frey advocates a very
different tactic than does Singer in respond
ing to animal suffering. His champion is not
the nural vegetarian but, rather, the "con
cerned individual. II
Concerned individuals
are nnved by the arguments and descriptions
in Singer's writings; they wish to end the
p:tinful raising and killing of animals.
But
they express this conviction not through
forswearing the consumption of meat. Rather,
they

Frey, I think it must be admitted, has a
point in principle.
If act-utilitarians
really are going to base moral decisions
solely on consequences, then they have to
spend more time than they generally do in
working out just what the consequences will
be.
Nonetheless,
some scepticism about
Frey's dire predictions is perhaps warranted,
and, as mentioned earlier, Frey omits to list
the benefits to humans accruing from a shift
to vegetarianism.

(a) strive to improve conditions on
factory farms, to eradicate some of
the devices and practices
upon
them, and to replace them with more
humane ones, (b) divert resources
into the developnent of new and
relatively
painless methods
of
breeding, feeding and killing ani
mals, of new pain-preventing and
pain-killing drugs, of new types of
tranquilizers and sedatives, etc.,
and (c) seek further appropriate
breakthroughs in genetic engineer
ing. (p. 182)

Steve F. Sap:Jntzis, in his forthcoming
11orals, Reason, and ~imals, has noted that,
grave as they are, Frey's points have the
character of temporary dislocations;
the
utility deficit they cause would in time be
made up for by the lack of animal p:tin, a
source of positive utility which will contin
ue indefinitely.
But I think that this re
sponse doesn't quite meet Frey's point.
On
his account, the concerned individual's stra
tegy would secure the benefit of lessened
animal pain without the expense of mass i ve
corporate, cultural, or individual disloca
tions--dislocations that would be likely to
occur even if the shift were a gradual one.
This is because the goal of the concerned
individual includes a thriving meat industry
in which animals have lives that are worth
living--ideally, p:tin-free lives.

The remainder of Frey's book is largely
an attempt to show that the concerned indivi
dual's choice of tactic is far sounder than
that of the moral vegetarian.
The most fundamental p:trt of Frey's
argument in favor of the "concerned indivi
dual tactic" is the complex clai.rn that it is
by no means evident that the interests sup
porting factory farming can only be combatted
effectively through vegetarianism, Singer to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Indeed, it
isn't clear that the call to vegetarianism
BEIWEm THE SPECIES

This consideration is buttressed by the
claim that the concerned individual's tactics
are more likely to work than the vegetari
an's.
Frey notes that despite the rise in
the number of vegetarians over the p:tst thir
ty years, the amount of meat produced has
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their industry. But why should they feel any
such threat, if Frey is correct about the
impotence of the vegetarian strategy?

skyrocketed.
In the face of this, it will
obviously take a massive nm~ of converts
to luoral vegetarianism to significantly miti
gate the suffering of fann animals; the im
pact of anyone person will be· extremely
small--perhaps nil--and this will certainly
reduce the odds that enough people will join
t..'1e boycott (aw-etreness of this J;Xlint will

The deepest issue, however, must be
this: ~ shoul~ IlDral ~~~tarianism and ~~
tactics of
the
individual be seen
- -concerned
- - - - - ----_.- - 
~ mutually exclusiv~ choic~?
Consider yet a third possibility:
the
CY.:mcerned moral vegetarian.
Concerned moral
vegetarians both refuse to eat meat and at
the same time engage in other activities
designed to improve t.'1e lot of animals.
It
seems likely that i t is this strategy which
is of optillal effectiveness, for it would put
the meat industry in the position of having
to face both ethical argwnents for ending the
exploitation of animals and an economic boy
cott that would force the industry to change
it,,; behavior.
If it is known that the lead
ers of the luovemeJlt have behind them a group
of people not only willing to write legisla
tors and to attend rallies but also to put a
crimp in the profits of agri-business, they
are likely to get a muc'1 luore syrnpathetic
hearing.
Perhaps Frey could concede that a con
cerned individual can be a vegetarian if
he/she wishes; he might simply say that there
is nothing obligatory about it.
But, given
the political effectiveness of vegetarianism,
anyone properly sensitive to the very "pain
ful practices" (p. 195) characteristic of
intensive farming, but who nevertheless re
fuses to stop eating meat, has sane explain
ing to do. Vegetarianism is, for him/her, at
least a E!:-~ facie obligation.
Further,
given the myriad of lUOrally worthy causes in
this world, there may well be uany who are
concerned about the i.mm:>ral aspects of . cur
rent food production but who are too involved
working for the women's mova-nent or . opJ;Xlsing
the arms race, and so fort..h, to spend the
sort of time and energy required by the con
ce.med individual strategy.
In such a case,
they can aid the alnelioration of animal suf
fering by joining the boycott--a strategy
recommended by the fact that it consumes very
little extra time or energy--and thus streng
then the hand of the concerned moral vegetar
ians who spearhead the movement, carrying the
fight into legislatures and board rooms. The
obverse of this strategy--relinquishing vege
tarianism while retaining one's concern--is
open to this objection: among the strategies
the concerned individual will use is the
economic power of boycott.
He/she will thus

fu..~er damage enthusiasm for vegetarianism,
and so on).

Are things different for the concerned
individual?
Surely, there isn't much that
one person can do in the face of the power of
the agri-business lobbies--a mass luovement is
needed to have much of an impact. And, given
that fact, won't exactly the same .pressures
work against someone contemplating whether to
become a concerned individual as those work
ing against the potential moral vegetarian?
Frey takes considerable pains to rebut
the charge that the concerned individual is
insincere or inconsistent in continuing to
eat meat, but it seems that the deeper issue
is why the individual's scheme is likely to
be any more effective than its competitor.
Perhaps he bases this idea on the hope that
the meat industry will see the amelioration
route as an acceptable C01-npromise between
continuing the current path of optimizing
profit by regarding animals simply as "bio
machines" and the virtual elimination of
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advocate that others ought to boycott meat
and wil~ be inconsistent i f he/she urges this
up:>n others yet shirks it him/herself.
This
is not because of sane principle that we must
have nothing to do with anything of which we
morally disapprove but for the particular
reason that he/she must advocate vegetarian
ism for others and, unless he/she is rele
vantly different fran his/her audience, he/
she must tak.e his/her own advice.

Strong the arm, strong the bow
The crystal stream • • •
And so falls the doe.
Strong the arm, strong the bow
The red-yellow leaves
Mother, I saw you go.

Frey might p:>int out here that even if
the concerned maral vegetarian strategy is
liable to be more effective than either the
concerned individual or the maral vegetarian
alone, the target of the campaign is not one
at which ~1imal liberationists custanarily
aim.
It is not the reform but the elimina
tion of factory fanning that is called for.
Of course, the question of how much refonn is
necessary cannot be said to have been an
s-wered by Frey's text, and until that is
clarified, whether the needed reform is can
patible with any kind of factory fanning is
unclear.
But even if it is, the alteration
in the lives of fann animals will have to be

Strong the arm, strong the bow
The November frost
They said you were spared the snow.
Strong the arm, strong the bow
The crystal stream •
You drank there once long ago.
Now, another autumn
Another bow • • •

substantial. If, after needed reforms, there
is
still something morally objectionable
about the rearing, killing, or consumption of
animals, it will take something other than
act-utilitarianism to illuminate just what it
is.
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(Berkeley:
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